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Miller: Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification

REVIEW OF THE MERITS IN CLASS ACTION
CERTIFICATION
Geoffrey P. Miller*
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,' the Supreme Court declared that
federal courts may not "conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action." 2 This proscription, sometimes known as the "Eisen rule," has
become a pillar of class action practice, both under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 and under state-court class action procedures. The rule
can have a crucial influence on whether a case is certified as a class
action and, given the importance of certification, on the success or
failure of the litigation.4
This Article analyzes the proper scope of a court's inquiry into the
merits when ruling on motions to certify a class. Part I of the Article
distinguishes three approaches to this question: strong-form rules that
prohibit inquiries into the merits and require the court to accept as true
the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; weak-form rules that
permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification;
* Stuyvesant P. and William T. IIIComfort Professor of Law, New York University. B.A.
1973, Princeton University; J.D. 1978, Columbia University. I thank Will Taft for excellent research
assistance.
1. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
2. Id. at 177.
3. For examples of state court endorsements of the Eisen principle, see Ex parte Holland,
692 So. 2d 811, 821-22 (Ala. 1997) and Ark. State Bd. of Educ. v. Magnolia Sch. Dist. No. 14, 769
S.W.2d 419,420 (Ark. 1989).
4. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d
Cir. 2001) (noting that certification is "often the defining moment in class actions"); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Tlhe class certification turns a
$200,000 dispute ... into a $200 million dispute. Such a claim... may induce a substantial
settlement even if the customers' position is weak."); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
746 (5th Cir. 1996) (remarking that certification can create "insurmountable" settlement pressure on
defendants); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing
settlement pressure from certification); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151
(2d Cir. 1987) (describing the $180,000,000 settlement as "nuisance value" given defendants'
liability exposure).
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and super-weak rules which permit or require the court to investigate the
class's chances of success in the litigation. Parts II through VI compare
these rules with respect to the values of fidelity to law, accuracy in
adjudication, fairness with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments,
settlement effects, and judicial economy. Part VII argues that weak-form
rules are superior to the alternative approaches.
I. THE FACES OF ESEN
The rule that the trial court should not inquire into the merits at the
time it decides the motion to certify a class is simple to state but difficult
to apply. The key terms, "merits" and "inquiry," have no clear meaning
in the law. The facts of Eisen provide little help. The case concerned
notice costs and not certification, rendering the rule pure dictum.5 Later
cases have only compounded the problem.6
This Part investigates possible approaches to the question of the
preliminary merits review on certification, classifying Eisen rules into
three stylized variants. The purpose is to identify types of rules that can
then be compared and contrasted along various dimensions of public
policy.
The following hypothetical illustrates contexts in which Eisen rules
may apply. Plaintiffs counsel brings a putative opt-out class action
against the manufacturer of a product alleging violations of a consumer
protection statute. Certification is governed by a class action rule
identical to Federal Rule 23. The consumer protection statute states that
the measure of damages is the difference between what the plaintiff paid
for the product and what the product would be worth if the defendant's
representations were true. The statute is ambiguous on whether
individual reliance can be presumed when the statements complained of
are contained in defendant's uniform printed materials.
Defendant resists certification on the following grounds: (1)
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the class is so numerous that
5. See Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis
Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 377 (1996).
6. Trial court decisions interpreting Eisen exhibit little coherence. Some courts even recite
inconsistent formulations of the rule as boilerplate in a single decision. See, e.g., In re Buspirone
Patent Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (listing formulations of the rule). Federal courts
of appeals have begun to address the subject under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(0, effective
in 1998, which permits discretionary appeals from orders granting or refusing class certification.
See, e.g., Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing tests applied
by the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts to determine when an appeal is appropriate). As
yet, however, the appellate jurisprudence remains sparse.
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joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) the issues common to the
class do not predominate over the individual issues because the measure
of damages requires a determination of how much each class member
paid for the product; (3) the representative plaintiff's claims are not
typical of the class because the products in question were manufactured
at different plants using different technologies; (4) the common
questions do not predominate because individual reliance is an element
of the action for damages; (5) predominance is lacking because some
class members made claims under the express warranty; and (6)
certification should be denied because the class's claims are frivolous.
What limitations (if any) does Eisen impose on the scope of the
court's inquiry and analysis? The questions on which issue is joined
involve distinctly different judicial inquiries.
The issue of numerosity is substantially unrelated to the merits. The
relevant inquiries are factors such as the number of members of the
class, their places of residence,7 and the ease of locating them and
joining them in an individual action. 8 One matter that may bear on
numerosity, the average size of class claims, 9 does potentially implicate
the merits (the stronger the claims, the larger the expected recovery per
class member). But by and large the inquiry is not merits-based.
The second issue, whether the determination of individual damages
defeats predominance, requires that the court at least look to the merits.
The predominance analysis requires a weighing of the common and
individual issues and a comparison between them. But such an inquiry,
while it does look to the merits, need not involve even a preliminary
assessment of any substantive issue. Because the statute is clear on the
measure of damages, the court merely needs to analyze whether the
common questions will predominate (e.g., take up more of the court's
and the litigants' time and efforts).' 0
The third issue is whether typicality is defeated because the
allegedly defective products were manufactured at different plants. The
court cannot properly evaluate this argument without investigating
whether the claims of class members who purchased products made in
one factory are different than the claims of class members who
purchased products made in the other factory. At least some inquiry into
7.
8.
9.
whether
10.

See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 95 F.R.D. 168, 175 (D. Del. 1982).
See, e.g., Patrykus v. Gomilla, 121 F.R.D. 357, 360-61 (N.D. I11.1988).
See, e.g., Esler v. Northrop Corp., 86 F.R.D. 20, 34 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (contemplating
"individual claims are for small amounts of damages" in ruling on certification).
See, e.g., Patrykus, 12 F.R.D. at 361.
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the merits appears to be required to reach an informed judgment about
this question.
The fourth issue turns on an interpretation of the consumer
protection statute. It is evident that the court cannot intelligently evaluate
whether individual questions of reliance defeat predominance without
knowing whether class members will have to prove reliance. But this is
also a key matter in dispute on the merits. If the court concludes
preliminarily that the statute requires individual reliance, this may defeat
certification, but it will also be a conclusion which, if it holds up at trial,
reduces the strength of the plaintiff's claims. Conversely, if the court
concludes preliminarily that individual reliance is not an element of the
statute, the court may conclude that the common issues predominate. But
if this conclusion holds up at trial, it will also strengthen the class's case
on the merits because class members will not have to establish
individual reliance in order to obtain relief. As to this issue, therefore,
the central focus of the certification inquiry directly overlaps a crucial
merits determination.
The fifth issue, going to waiver of claims, may involve both factual
and legal inquiries. Factually, the plaintiff's counsel may contest the
defendant's argument that numerous class members made claims under
the warranty; legally, counsel may argue that a claim under the warranty
does not foreclose a subsequent lawsuit under the consumer protection
statute. Each of these issues is tied up in the merits, but the scope of
preliminary inquiry differs. As to the legal issues, the court need only
consider the briefs and arguments of the parties (supplemented if
necessary by the court's own research). As to the factual questions, the
court could consider documentary evidence or witness testimony and
may allow adversarial testing (for example, depositions or crossexamination).
The final issue is distinctive in that it does not bear on any specific
issue of class certification. In arguing that the class claims are frivolous,
the defendant is inviting the court to use class certification as a
preliminary screen to filter out bad cases. The scope of preliminary
inquiry needed to address this issue will necessarily be broader than the
inquiries needed for other issues because here the matter in question is
the ultimate issue for resolution in the lawsuit.
With this example in mind, we can attempt to make sense of
possible rules. Some issues are not in dispute. Courts agree that the
Eisen rule applies only to the merits. Thus, in the example above, Eisen
would not preclude investigation into numerosity because this inquiry
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has no substantial relationship to the merits.'1 It is also clear that the
Eisen rule does not preclude a careful analysis of the pleadings so long
as the court makes no judgments about the substantive claims. Finally, it
is clear that the ultimate burden of proof on certification rests on the
party seeking class treatment-nearly always the plaintiff. Beyond these
areas of agreement, however, the case law offers a menu of
interpretations.
A.

Strong-Form Rules

The most common formulation holds that a court ruling on a
motion to certify the class may not go beyond the face of the pleadings
with respect to any issues relating to the merits, but must instead accept
as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.12 This strong-form
rule involves a number of subsidiary questions as to which courts may
express different opinions:
(a) Can there be inquiry beyond the pleadings if the matter in
dispute goes to the merits of the named plaintiff's case, but not to the
merits of the class case as a whole? This situation often arises when the
defendant challenges the representative plaintiffs adequacy or
typicality. 13 In Cheney v. CyberguardCorp., 14 the defendant argued that
the named plaintiffs were inadequate because they provided testimony
that was demonstrably false. 15 The court rejected the argument, citing
the principle that "any inquiry concerning... credibility is an
impermissible examination of the merits."' 6 Here, the court applied a
strong-form rule to bar inquiry into the named plaintiffs case. In other
11.Courts may look beyond the pleadings in assessing whether the numerosity requirement is
met. See, e.g., Verdow v. Sutkowy, 209 F.R.D. 309, 311-12 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Potter v. Citicorp &
Citibank, No. 1999/116, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11596, at *10 (D.V.I. April 4, 2002); Sheinhartz v.
Saturn Transp. Sys., Inc., No. 00-2489, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6198, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 26,
2002).
12. See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999); In re
Buspirone Patent Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209
F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002).
13. See, e.g., Lagner v. Brown, No. 95-Civ-1981, 1996 WL 709757 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1996)

(refusing to consider a challenge to the named plaintiff's typicality and adequacy on strong-form
grounds); Wilson v. Pa. State Police Dep't, No. 94-CV-6547, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9981, at **7-8
(E.D. Pa. July 17, 1995) (rejecting consideration of the extent of plaintiffs' impairments and the
effect of the employer's standards in considering typicality because it would require a review of the
merits of the case).
14. 211 F.R.D. 478 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
15. Id.at 490.
16. Id.(quoting Powers v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 313, 317 n.6 (S.D. Fla.
1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cases, however, courts do not apply a strong-form rule strictly when the
merits issues relate only to the individual plaintiff. 7
(b) What should the court do with respect to defenses? In the
example above, this issue would be raised by the defendant's argument
that class members who claimed under the express warranty waived their
rights to obtain relief under other legal theories, thereby creating
individual defenses that defeat predominance. Some courts refuse
certification if the defendant's pleadings raise affirmative defenses18
which, if true, would negate an element required for certification.
Other courts apply a strong-form rule in a pro-plaintiff way even for
defenses, holding that to take cognizance of the defenses would delve
impermissibly into the merits.1 9 Still others deal with this problem
through interpretations of Rule 23. They hold that it is not necessary to
look beyond the pleadings because the affirmative defenses, even if
proven, would not defeat certification. z
(c) The scope of a strong-form rule also depends on the detail that
courts will require in pleadings. Merely alleging that Rule 23 is satisfied
is not sufficient. 21 Neither are pleadings that refer to the elements of
Rule 23 in purely conclusory fashion. 22 The pleadings must set forth "an
adequate statement of the basic facts. 23 But they need not contain the
sort of detail that is required, for example, for allegations of common
law fraud.24
(d) Courts adopting a strong-form rule sometimes justify inquiries
beyond the pleadings on the ground that they do not involve the
"merits." In Lehocky v. Tidel Technologies, Inc., the court faced the
question of whether a fraud-on-the-market presumption obviated the
need to prove reliance for each class member, an issue going to

17. See, e.g., Cromer Fin. Ltd. v. Berger, 205 F.R.D. 113, 120, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(recognizing that inquiries into the merits are prohibited under Eisen, but still inquiring into
defendant's claim that the representative plaintiffs were not adequate because they lacked
credibility).
18. See Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir. 1998);
see also Priya Laroia, IndividualizedAffirmative Defenses Bar Class Certification-PerSe, 2003 U.
Cmt, LEGAL F. 805, 810-15 (2003).
19. See In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D. 130, 139-40 (D.N.J. 1984) (declaring
that "even if... defendants.., can prove non-reliance as an affirmative defense, this goes to the
merits of the case and cannot be considered by the court on a certification motion").
20. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296-97 (1 st Cir. 2000).
21. In re Am. Medical Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d. 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996).

22. Id.
23. Id.
24.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring plaintiffs to plead fraud with particularity).
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certification.2 ' The court took evidence on this question on the ground
that the fraud-on-the-market analysis was not an inquiry into the
"merits. 2 6 By manipulating the concept of the "merits," the court was
able to remain formally in compliance with a strong-form rule while still
considering evidence relevant to certification.27
(e) Courts that endorse a strong-form rule typically permit the trial
judge to go beyond the pleadings to "understand" the case.28 The court's
job is to "envison" the form a trial will take. 29 This approach, drawing on
the Manual for Complex Litigation (Third),30 attempts to reconcile the
notion that Eisen precludes going beyond the pleadings with the
practical necessity of doing so if judicial rulings on matters such as
predominance are to be meaningful. 3' Even if the court engages in a
thorough examination of the pleadings,3 2 however, its task under a
strong-form Eisen rule is only to predict how the trial will proceed, not
to resolve contested issues of fact or law.33
(f) A rule against probing behind the pleadings will not prevent
preliminary inquiries if the pleadings are patently frivolous. 34 In Martin
v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 35 the representative plaintiffs
proposed class included all recipients of the defendant's penile implant
devices. The court looked behind the pleadings and concluded that many

25. 220 F.R.D. 491 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
26. Id.at 505 & n.16 (S.D. Tex. 2004). The merits would be implicated, said the court, only if
the defendant sought to rebut the presumption with respect to a given class member. Id.
27. See id.
at 505-06.
28. E.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Sheinhartz
v. Saturn Transp. Sys., Inc., No. 00-2489, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6198, at *8 (D. Minn. March 26,
2002); Dhamer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 183 F.R.D. 520, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
29. Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 489 (S.D. Ill. 1999).
30. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.11, at 214 (1995). This idea is
absent in the latest iteration of the manual. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) 26668 (2004).
31. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules seemed to adopt this position in its report on the
2003 amendments to Rule 23, opining that "[a]lthough an evaluation of the probable outcome on the
merits is not properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision
often includes information required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented
at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the 'merits,' limited to
those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an informed basis." FED. R. Civ. P. 23
advisory committee's notes on 2003 amendments.
32. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 140 (3d Cir. 1998).
33. See Clay, 188 F.R.D. at 489.
34. See Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 F.R.D. 596, 606 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ("A court need
not accept a facially frivolous claim that stock was traded on an efficient market.").
35. No. IP 94-2067-C H/G, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22169, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 1995).
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recipients had not experienced problems.3 6 Because such class members
were not harmed, the plaintiff was neither typical of the class nor
capable of providing adequate representation. 37 It appears clear that the
judge found the allegation that all devices had malfunctioned to be
patently incredible and rejected it on this ground. Similarly, courts
employing a strong-form rule may look beyond the pleadings when an
issue of law bearing on certification is conclusively established by
controlling precedent. McBride v. Reliastar Mortgage Corp.38 was a
putative class action under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
("RESPA"). The plaintiff alleged that the common issues predominated
because the defendant's practice of paying mortgage brokers for order
flow violated the statutory rights of all class members. 39 Refusing to
certify the class, the court observed that merely paying for order flow
was not enough to state a cause of action under RESPA; individualized
proof was required. 40 The court, in other words, refused to accept the
plaintiffs characterization of the case and instead conducted its own
analysis of governing law.
(g) The application of a strong-form rule may vary depending on
whether the issue is one of fact or law. As to factual inquiries, the rule is
typically applied in a straightforward way. In the example above,
defendant alleges that the plaintiff would not be an adequate or typical
representative of class members who purchased goods manufactured at
other plants, while the plaintiff alleges that all of the defendant's
products wherever manufactured were subject to the defect. For
purposes of the motion for class certification, a court employing a
strong-form rule would accept as true the plaintiffs allegation that all
products were subject to the defect regardless of place of manufacture.
Application of a strong-form rule to questions of law is more
problematic. In Rosen v. Fidelity Fixed Income Trust,4 1 the defendant
issued three registration statements.42 The representative plaintiff alleged
that she purchased her shares in reliance on one of the statements.4 3 This
raised a certification issue: Was the representative plaintiff typical of the
class when some class members had purchased shares, as to which a
36. Id. at*16.
37. ld. at * 16-18.
38. No. 1:98-CV-215-TWT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21654 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 1999).
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id. at *10-11.
41. 169 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
42. Id. at 296 n.3.
43. Id. at 299 n.6.
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different registration statement was in effect? The court was unsure
whether the representative plaintiff could claim injury stemming from
misstatements in another registration statement," identical in material
respects to the one covering the representative plaintiffs security. 45 The
court avoided this issue by reference to Eisen. Whether a party who has
been misled by one registration statement has standing to recover for
other registration statements was a merits issue foreclosed to the court in
ruling on class certification.4 6 Thus, typicality was not defeated: "To the
extent that Plaintiff may pursue her [securities law] claims against each
of the three registration statements, her claims are typical of class. 47
Other courts do not apply a strong-form rule to purely legal questions,
however. In Gibbs Products Corp. v. Cigna Corp.,48 a question at
certification was whether the class was entitled to a presumption of
reliance in a RICO mail fraud claim. 49 If the court had applied the facial
validity standard to this issue it would have accepted the plaintiff's
interpretation of RICO. Instead, the court inquired into the merits and
held that a presumption of reliance was not allowed. 50
B.

Weak-Form Rules

Weak-form rules permit preliminary inquiries into the merits. 5' In
the hypothetical case described above, for example, it might be desirable
for the trial court to inquire into the defendant's claim that different
technologies of production at different plants defeated certification. But
the inquiry under a weak-form rule can appropriately be circumscribed
and need not take the form of a full trial-type investigation. Thus, it
might not be necessary for the court to inquire into the related issue of
whether the technologies were equally prone to producing the alleged
defect.
Weak-form rules are finding increasing acceptance. Two court of
appeals decisions from 2001 are particularly noteworthy. In Szabo v.

44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 196 F.R.D. 430 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
49. Id.at 438.
50. Id. at 438-39.
51. See, e.g., In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding that a
court is "at liberty to consider evidence which goes to the requirements of Rule 23 even though the
evidence may also relate to the underlying merits of the case").
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Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,52 Judge Easterbrook denounced strong-form
rules as having "nothing to recommend [them]. 53 The trial court must
instead make "whatever factual and legal inquires are necessary., 54 If
such an inquiry involved the merits, so be it. Similarly, in Newton v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,55 the plaintiffs produced
expert testimony on predominance purporting to demonstrate that
economic loss for each class member could be determined with a simple
formula. 56 Because this testimony claimed to provide a potentially viable
measure of class-wide damages, it had an obvious bearing on the merits.
Observing that "a preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes
necessary to determine whether the alleged claims can be properly
resolved as a class action,"'57 Judge Scirica evaluated and rejected the
testimony as both unpersuasive and inadequate to establish compliance
with Rule 23(b)(3).

8

Weak-form rules implicate two subsidiary questions: First, they
require an analysis of when an inquiry into the merits is excessive
because it goes beyond what is appropriate to a ruling on class
certification. Some courts employing a weak-form rule declare that the
court should not make unnecessary inquiries into the merits. 59 If strictly
applied, a necessity standard would allow inquiries into the merits only
if a court could not otherwise make a reasoned decision on a certification
question. Yet strict necessity may not always be required. Some courts
indicate that Eisen merely requires that the trial court exercise caution in
evaluating the merits. 60 The suggestion may be that while courts should

52. 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 675.
54. Id. at 676.
55. 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001).
56. Id.at 188 & n.33.
57. Id. at 168.
58. Id.at 186-93.
59. See, e.g., Fisher v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 217 F.R.D. 201, 211 (E.D. Va. 2003) (stating
that "the Court will inquire no further into the merits than is necessary to determine the likely
contours of this action should it proceed on a representative basis"); Rhodes v. Cracker Barrel Old
Country Store, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 619, 671 (N.D. Ga. 2003); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust

Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677, 684 (N.D. Ga. 2001). In some cases a necessity standard is implied. See,
e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Going beyond the pleadings is
necessary, as a court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable
substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.") (emphasis
added); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane) ("It is inescapablethat

in some cases there will be overlap between the demands of [Rule 23] and the question of whether
plaintiff can succeed on the merits.") (emphasis added).
60.

See Newton, 259 F.3d at 166.
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not willfully reach out to decide merits issues, neither should they avoid
inquiries that would be convenient and useful to the resolution of the
certification motion, even if the court might be able to make a reasoned
decision without this information. Second, there will be delicate
questions as to how preliminary the preliminary inquiry must be. Courts
tend to provide upper and lower bounds: The hearing on class
certification should not amount to a "mini-trial, 61 but the court must at
least survey the factual scene on a "kind of sketchy relief map.",62 These
admonitions leave room for investigation of merits issues so long as the
investigation does not become protracted or complex. In exercising this
discretion, the court will need to determine issues such as how extensive
the hearing will be, what evidence will be considered, and what
safeguards on reliability of evidence will be imposed.
Courts employing a weak-form rule may consider not only the
intensity of inquiry but also the directness of connection between the
matters inquired into at certification and the merits at trial. In some
cases, the results of the court's inquiry at certification, while related to
the merits, will only be indirectly related to the trial outcome. For
example, the court may ask whether a securities market was sufficiently
efficient to qualify for a fraud-on-the-market presumption. The results of
this ruling, if they hold up through trial, will impact the expected
outcome; if the market is found to be efficient, plaintiffs will enjoy a
presumption of reliance and may find it easier to establish causation and
damages. But a ruling that the market is efficient for purposes of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption will not in itself establish liability or
damages. Compare this with cases where the evidence on certification
has a direct bearing on the merits. In Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand,63 for
example, the defendant argued that representative plaintiffs were
inadequate because they had purchased securities after the defendant's
truthful disclosures had cured the market. Resolving this issue would
have required the court to decide whether the defendant had in fact cured
the market. The court declined to address the question because the
certification issue could be resolved with other facts not so deeply
intertwined with the merits.64

61. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
62. Prof'l Adjusting Sys. of Am. v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 35, 38
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
63. 216 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
64. See id at 614. Specifically, the court found that the representative plaintiffs had purchased
before the alleged cure.
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C. Super- Weak Rules
Super-weak rules allow or encourage the court at certification to
evaluate the plaintiffs ultimate probability of success at trial (we will
refer to this value as p). 65 The sixth issue in the hypothetical case
discussed above illustrates this question: the defendant argues that
certification should be denied because the plaintiffs claims are
frivolous. Rhone-Poulenc,66 the leading case, used such an approach.67
Judge Posner refused to certify a nationwide class of hemophiliacs who
claimed that they had contracted AIDS through tainted transfusions, in
part because he viewed p as exceptionally low. 68 Super-weak rules open
all substantive matters for review at certification, subject only to the
court's discretion to limit the preliminary inquiry in the interests of
efficiency and expedition.

II.

FIDELITY TO LAW

A starting place for comparison is the extent to which these variants
are supportable under existing law. Strong-form rules have been recited
and applied by numerous state and federal courts in the years since
Eisen. Yet, while support for strong-form rules may be wide, it is not
deep. Judges typically invoke strong-form rules as a shortcut on the path
to certification. They rarely consider whether such rules are correct
interpretations of Eisen or Rule 23. In fact, strong-form rules cannot be

65. Several commentators have recently recommended adoption of super-weak rules. For
example, Bartlett H. McGuire advocates a "substantial possibility of success" standard for review of
the substantive merits at certification. McGuire, supra note 5, at 396-400. Additionally, Robert G.
Bone and David S. Evans propose a super-weak form rule under which the district court would be
required to investigate the plaintiffs case in its entirety and permitted to certify a class only if it
concluded that the underlying claims met a "likelihood of success" standard. Robert G. Bone and
David S. Evans, Class Certificationand the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251 (2002). A superweak form rule allowing a preliminary hearing on the merits is recommended for tort class actions
by Stephen Berry. Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperativefor
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 312-15 (1980).
Similarly, George Priest argues that for mass tort actions, if the trial court determines that the
substantive case is "without merit," class certification should be denied. See George L. Priest,
Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 573
(1997).
66. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
67. See also Alexander v. Q.T.S. Corp., No. 98 C 3234, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16169 (N.D.
I11.1999). After citing Eisen for the proposition that the court could not delve into the merits on
certification, the court observed that the plaintiffs had presented "sufficient evidence" to establish
that the claims were not insubstantial. Id. at ** 17-18.
68. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,Inc., 51 F.3d at 1292.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss1/2

12

2004]

Miller: Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification
CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION

justified on principles of fidelity to law. They find no grounding in the
text of Rule 23 and are inconsistent with its purposes. 69 It would be
bizarre to conclude that the framers of Rule 23 would have set forth a
careful set of prerequisites for class certification only to deny trial courts
the ability to apply those prerequisites in a factually-based and reasoned
manner.
Nor can strong-form rules be justified as mandated by Eisen itself.
Eisen does not prohibit inquiries into the merits for purposes of
determining whether a class is properly certifiable. The opinion rejected
only preliminary inquiries into the merits that were unrelated to the
criteria of Rule 23, i.e., that had no proper relevance to certification.70
Thus, even taking Eisen's language at face value, it does not mandate a
strong-form rule.
Strong-form rules, moreover, cannot be reconciled with later
Supreme Court cases. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon71 admonished trial courts to conduct a "rigorous analysis" at
certification 72-an instruction flatly inconsistent with the hands-off
approach to the merits demanded under a strong-form rule. Similarly,
Basic Inc. v. Levinson73 substituted a substantive presumption of reliance
for the blinders on judicial vision that a strong-form rule imposes. 74 The
fraud-on-the-market presumption in Basic cannot be intelligently
administered without at least a preliminary look at the merits-related
issue of whether the relevant market is efficient.
Although strong-form rules continue to attract support in the lower
federal courts,75 the trend is against them.7 6 Even courts paying lip
service to strong-form rules may undermine them by tone and nuance,
cautioning that they should not be "talismanically invoked to artificially

69. See McGuire, supra note 5, at 379 (describing the irony of the settlement class, where
approval requires considering the merits as authorized by Rule 23(e), and how that is inconsistent
with the fact that doing so is ordinarily barred).
70. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
71. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
72. Id. at 161. On the relationship between Falcon and Eisen, see Love v. Turlington, 733
F.2d 1562, 1564 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Bone & Evans, supra note 65, at 1267-68; and Laroia, supra note
18, at 810 (recognizing that "a tension exists between Eisen and Falcon").
73. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
74. Id. at 243. See also In re Seagate Technology 11 Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1367
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that Basic cannot be reconciled with Eisen).
75. See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
76. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d
Cir. 2001); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001); McGuire, supra
note 5, at 374.
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limit" a trial court's reasoned determination on certification. 77 Strongform rules, in short, have little justification under governing law aside
from the fact that they have been uncritically accepted for so long.
Super-weak rules have even less foundation. They find no
authorization in the specific provisions of Rule 23. Perhaps a super-weak
rule could be justified as an additional, non-statutory prerequisite for
other non-statutory
certification
certification. 78 But
unlike
requirements, 79 a prerequisite that the class meet some threshold
probability of success on the merits cannot plausibly be explained as
necessary for the effective administration of the requirements that are
explicitly found in the rule.
Super-weak rules are also inconsistent with any reasonable
interpretation of Eisen itself.80 The very defect complained of in Eisen
was the fact that the district court had investigated p.8 1 Only one lower
federal court, the Seventh Circuit, has endorsed a super-weak rule, 82 and
83
even this decision has been questioned by later authority in the circuit.
In contrast to strong-form and super-weak rules, weak-form rules
are easy to justify under existing law. The court applying a weak-form
rule is simply engaged in the normal and expected judicial task of
marshalling relevant evidence and applying the law to the facts. In fact,
any reasonable interpretation of Rule 23 mandates a weak-form rule,
since the framers of the rule must have intended to equip trial courts
with the resources to make an informed and reasoned decision.

77. Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp.,
213 F.R.D. 484, 489 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (quoting Love, supra).
78. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1439 (1995).
79. Non-statutory requirements have been recognized in addition to the explicit requirements
for certification under Rules 23(a) and (b), such as that there be a reasonably definite class. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351, 352 (N.D. Ill.
1997). In a Rule 23(b)(2)
case, the requirement that the class be sufficiently cohesive as to make classwide adjudication
appropriate was also recognized. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 142 (3d Cir.
1998).
80. See In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 460 (D.Wyo. 1995) (interpreting RhonePoulenc as inconsistent with Eisen).
81. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.156, 178 (1974). But see Priest, supra note 65, at
573 (suggesting that Eisen "does not directly preclude this second, negative review: the
determination that if the underlying substantive claim is without merit, class certification should be
denied").
82. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
83. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.)
(commenting that "[t]he success of the 1966 amendments (which are still in force) depends on...
judicial willingness to certify classes that have weak claims as well as strong ones.").
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Weak-form rules are consistent with Eisen. As noted, that opinion
merely repudiated the practice of inquiring into p at the class
certification stage. 84 It did not prohibit inquiries at certification that
overlapped merits issues when the purpose of the preliminary inquiry
was to evaluate compliance with Rule 23.85 Indeed, the Court indicated
that preliminary inquiries into the merits are often necessary to
determine "whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.",86 Weak-form
rules are also consistent with the "rigorous analysis" demanded by the
Supreme Court's later decision in Falcon.87 They authorize trial courts to
inquire into the merits whenever doing so is convenient or useful to
resolve a certification question. Weak-form rules are likewise indicated
by the Court's decision in Basic;88 a trial court cannot realistically
inquire into the efficiency of the market without preliminarily examining
a question which is deeply interwoven with the merits. Consistent with
these cases, the recent trend in the lower federal courts has been to
endorse weak-form rules. 9
III.

ACCURACY IN ADJUDICATION

The Eisen Court objected to preliminary inquiries on the ground
that that the lack of trial-type procedures would result in inaccurate
decisions. 90 Two possible errors are relevant: (a) error in certification;
and (b) error at trial. 91
A.

Errorin Certification

92
Strong-form rules create significant dangers of certification error.
There is no doubt that merits issues can be relevant to certification.93

84.
85.

See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.
See id. at 171-72.

86. Id at 178 (quoting Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971)).
87. Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982)
88.
89.
90.

Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
See cases cited at note 76, supra.
See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78. See also In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 56

(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (reaching the merits might "subject some parties to adverse merits rulings without
the benefit of the rules and procedural safeguards that traditionally apply in civil trials"); Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Policy Holders & Members, 918 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1996).
91. For general discussion about the value of accuracy in adjudication, see Louis Kaplow, The
Value ofAccuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).

92. Consistent with the analysis in this paper, Bone and Evans conclude that courts are more
likely to commit error in certification decisions under Eisen than under a rule that permits a court to
make a preliminary inquiry into the merits at the certification stage. See Bone & Evans, supra note
65, at 1313-17. Their model depends on the proposition that in an Eisen regime, class action
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Obviously a court is more likely to make a correct decision on
certification if it is allowed to look into the relevant facts and
the truth of the facts
circumstances than if it is limited to accepting
94
presented in the pleadings of a biased litigant.
The impact of super-weak rules depends in part on whether p is a
criterion or factor for certification under Rule 23. If p is not a
certification factor, judicial inquiry into p may increase error at
certification because the court will consider a potentially confounding
question. On the other hand, inquiry into p may to some extent also
improve accuracy in the certification decision to the extent that p
correlates with a specific Rule 23 factor.
If p is a certification factor, then a preliminary inquiry into p will
improve accuracy of certification decisions, provided the court correctly
assesses p. There are reasons to believe courts will often assess p
correctly. The trial judge will usually be experienced at assessing

attorneys will be more likely to file frivolous lawsuits, which are not effectively screened due to the
Eisen rule and which therefore generate a rate of erroneous certification grants under Eisen that is
higher than the rate of erroneous certification denials under a regime allowing preliminary inquiry.
The Bone-Evans model depends on the premise that strong-form jurisdictions will attract a
significant number of frivolous lawsuits. As yet there is no empirical verification of this proposition.
The Bone-Evans model also ignores the costs in review-of-the-merits jurisdictions associated with
the possibility that non-frivolous class actions will not be brought because of the possibility of
erroneous refusals to certify. More fundamentally, the Bone-Evans model does not account for
another reason why errors in certification are more likely under a strong-form rule than under a rule
permitting preliminary inquiry. Because the merits are often relevant to certification, a court that is
permitted to inquire into them at the certification is more likely to reach a correct result than a court
that is barred from such an inquiry.
93. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (".[T]he class
determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues
comprising the plaintiff's cause of action."' (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
469 (1978) (additional quotation marks omitted)).
94. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The court is bound
to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as true, thus necessarily making the class order
speculative in the sense that the plaintiff may be altogether unable to prove his allegations.")
Although the court may revise a certification order found to be erroneous, see FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1 )(C) ("[an order [certifying a class] may be altered or amended before final judgment"), this
is no reason to allow error at the outset. Later correction of erroneous certification grants will not
avoid the interim costs incurred by the parties (including notice costs) during the period in which
the class was certified. As a practical matter, moreover, cases are rarely decertified. Reliance on
later review of certification orders as an answer to the error problem can encourage sloppy analysis
at the front end. See S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000) (rejecting a "certify
now and worry later" approach to certification); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675,
691 (Tex. 2002) (reaffirming that certification may only be based on "actual, not presumed,
conformance" with the class action rule (quoting Bernal, supra,at 439)).
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litigation outcomes. 95 The judge, moreover, has discretion over how the
preliminary inquiry should be conducted. Where the facts or law are
clear, the judge may be able to reach a reliable result in fairly short
order. Where the issues are murkier, the judge may require a more
intensive process before "coming to rest.",96 Judges will not always
assess p correctly, however. P is not a narrow issue that can be
addressed in a focused pre-trial inquiry. In consequence, the lack of trialtype procedures at certification might impair accuracy in the court's
assessment. 97 Even if p is a factor at certification, therefore, there
appears to be a non-trivial risk that a trial court employing a super-weak
rule will incorrectly assess p and decide the certification erroneously.
Weak-form rules are clearly superior to strong-form rules as far as
certification error is concerned. It could hardly be otherwise because
weak-form rules permit inquiry into relevant issues foreclosed to the
court under strong-form rules. 98 The comparison with super-weak rules
is more complicated. If p is a factor at certification, the weak-form rule
could be inferior to the super-weak rule as regards the probability of
error at certification because the weak-form rule would prohibit the trial
court from considering relevant information. On the other hand, because
the inquiry under a weak-form rule is more focused than under a superweak rule, the increased certification error resulting from the failure to
consider p would have to be weighed against the greater probability of
correctly analyzing the factors that are considered. If p is not a factor at
certification, the weak-form rule is strictly superior to the super-weak
rule. The weak-form rule focuses the court's attention on the factors
relevant to certification and does not direct the court's attention to a
potentially confounding inquiry.

95.

Motions for preliminary injunctions are an example. The court in such cases is not only

permitted, but in fact required to look into the merits in such cases in order to weigh the parties'

respective probabilities of success.
96.

Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.

97. Important documents or witnesses may be unavailable, for example. Even if such
evidence is available, the court may exclude it in the interest of expediting the certification inquiry.
Witness testimony may not be properly evaluated for credibility. The relevant assessment rule may
also play a role: If the court is required to place a thumb on the scale when reviewing the plaintiff's
evidence, the result will be to increase the probability of erroneous certifications.
98. See, e.g., In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (presenting an
example of a court applying weak-form rules and allowing an inquiry into the merits of the lawsuit
if it relates to the requirements of Rule 23).
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B. Errorat Trial
Turning to error at trial, consider first the application of a strongform rule. Because the court gives no consideration to the merits under a
strong-form rule, the certification decision should have no effect on the
accuracy of trial outcomes. Whether or not it is certified, the litigation
progresses like any other case with the facts and law determined in the
ordinary course.
Super-weak rules have an ambiguous effect on trial accuracy. As
we have seen, the court's preliminary inquiry into p may or may not be
accurate. An accurate assessment ofp may improve the accuracy of trial.
Because the court has an early exposure to the case, the judge will be
familiar with the facts and law and will likely make better rulings. The
judge's preliminary rulings may also facilitate more accurate
settlements. An inaccurate assessment of p creates a significant risk of
error at trial, however. 99 Many judges will avoid placing inappropriate
weight on the results of the preliminary investigation and will be open to
changing their views as trial progresses. But some judges may feel that
changing their previously-announced views would reflect negatively on
their abilities. Other judges might experience a cognitive bias created
when an initial view of the case, although erroneous, becomes fixed in
their minds.100 If the judge for whatever reason is unduly attached to her
erroneous estimate of p, the effect may be to alter the trial outcome
unless the merits are clear. This is the scenario that troubled the Court in
Eisen when it warned 0that "tentative findings... may 'color' the
subsequent proceedings."' 1
Weak-form rules are likely to be somewhat less effective at
achieving accuracy at trial than strong-form rules. When the court
examines a merits issue relevant to certification, this may introduce the
possibility of bias at trial with respect to that issue. However, because
the inquiry under a weak-form rule is focused on particular issues, the
court is likely to make a correct determination of the merits issue at

99. See McGuire, supra note 5, at 402-03 (recognizing that "preliminary assessments could be
very troublesome-and misleading-if they were based on inadequate information and therefore
unreliable" but arguing that the concern is not as great as commonly supposed because of
safeguards that can be incorporated into the preliminary hearing).
100. Similarly, where the parties reach a settlement of the case, the judge will have to evaluate
the proposal for fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness. If the judge has been erroneously
preconditioned to maintain a certain attitude towards the litigation, this may influence how the judge
assesses the settlement, resulting in the possibility of error harmful to absent class members.
101. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974).
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certification, and thus the chance of subsequent bias that distorts
outcomes at trial will be low. Moreover, bias with respect to a particular
issue may not translate into distortions in outcome because many other
issues as to which the court does not have a bias will contribute to the
result. At the same time, weak-form rules direct the court's attention to
merits issues at an early stage of the litigation and thus may assist the
court in making better decisions later on.
Weak-form rules may or may not be superior to super-weak rules as
regards accuracy at trial. If the court accurately assesses p, a super-weak
rule will be superior to a weak-form rule because the latter excludes
consideration of p and an accurate assessment of p should improve trial
accuracy. If the court erroneously assesses p, the weak-form rule will
that the
usually be superior to the super-weak rule because of the danger
02
trial.1
at
error
the
correct
not
will
regime
super-weak
a
court in
IV.

FAIRNESS WITH RESPECT TO THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF
JUDGMENTS

The Eisen Court was also concerned that preliminary inquiries into
the merits would inflict "substantial prejudice" on defendants 0 3 by
skewing the playing field in plaintiffs' favor with respect to the
preclusive effect of judgments. Prior to 1966, potential plaintiffs in
"spurious" class action could wait in the wings and await developments
in the case before deciding whether to participate.' °4 They could
intervene when the outcome was, or was likely to be, favorable and
remain outside the case when the outcome was, or was likely to be,
unfavorable.105 Rule 23(c)(1) was designed in part to discourage such
102. The court might also make an error in its assessment of the merits under a weak-form rule.
However, we have seen that because the inquiry is more focused in weak-form rules, the possibility
of error is considerably lower than the possibility that a court applying a super-weak rule will make
an error as to p. For the same reason, if the court does make an error on the merits under a weakform rule, this is less likely to skew the outcome as compared with a strong-form rule, where the
issues presented on certification are the ultimate issues in the case.
103. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178.

104. See Am. Pipe & Constr.Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 546-47 (1974) ("If the evidence at the
trial made their prospective position as actual class members appear weak, or if a judgment
precluded the possibility of a favorable determination, such putative members of the class who
chose not to intervene or join as parties would not be bound by the judgment.").
105. See id.("A recurrent source of abuse under the former Rule lay in the potential that
members of the claimed class could in some situations await developments in the trial or even final
judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation would be favorable to their
interests."); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1974) ("Many commentators
objected that one-way intervention had the effect of giving collateral estoppel effect to the judgment
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"one-way intervention" by bringing parties into the case at the earliest
practicable time.10 6 Mutuality of estoppel would thus be enhanced.'0 7 But
preliminary inquiry might reintroduce one-way intervention in a new
guise because it would allow absent plaintiffs to be bound by favorable
judgments and to avoid unfavorable ones. This is the concern that led the
Eisen Court to declare that preliminary inquiries into the merits were
"directly contrary" to Rule 23(c)(l). 0 8
This section compares different Eisen rules with respect to the
preclusive effect of judgments. Two situations are relevant: cherrypicking cases where plaintiffs obtain a litigation advantage over the
defendants through informed use of opt-out rights, and cherry-dropping
cases where the non-mutuality of estoppel is a function of certification
itself and does not depend on the volitional act of any class members.
A.

Cherry-Picking:Unfairness Due to Informed Exercise of Opt-Out
Rights

The following model illustrates the problem of cherry-picking. Call
an absent class member P and the defendant D. Cases have merit when p
is at least 5% and lack merit when p is less than 5%. When cases have
of liability in a case where the estoppel was not mutual. This was thought to be unfair to the
defendant."). Opposition to one-way intervention was not universal. One of the most influential
articles on class action practice under old Rule 23 supported one-way intervention, notwithstanding
the perception that it "isn't cricket" to allow class members to "place their bets after the race was
over." Harry Kalven Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 713 (1941) Kalven and Rosenfield are not responsible for the mixed sports
metaphor, which is due to combining quotes from different sentences. Their support of one-way
intervention was due, in part, to their belief that the Constitution would not permit otherwise
unrelated parties who had not joined the action to be bound by the preclusive effect of a judgment.
106. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 547 ("The 1966 amendments were designed, in
part, specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that members of the
class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and
judgments."); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461, 463 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (addressing a 1966
amendment intended to prevent "sideline sitting" by class members); Sarasota Oil Co. v. Greyhound
Leasing & Financial Corp., 483 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1973); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 309 F.
Supp. 354 (D.Ohio 1969) (revisions were intended to prevent one-way intervention).
107. Katz, 496 F.2d at 759.
108. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. Although the Court indicated that preliminary inquiries were
"directly contrary" to Rule 23(c)(1), it could not have meant that such inquires violated an express
prohibition of the rule. The word "practicable" gives trial courts a significant degree of discretion to
manage the timing of decisions, including the power in appropriate cases to consider merits issues
prior to certification. Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 92-93 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995)). This discretion has been
enhanced under newly-amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), which requires only that
the certification decision be made at an "early practicable time."
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merit, p is either low or high. At certification, the court applies a strongform, weak-form, or super-weak rule. Under the strong-form rule the
court certifies the class without inquiring into p. Under the super-weak
rule the court investigates p and certifies it finds the case to have merit
and refuses to certify if it finds the case to lack merit. In either event the
court issues an opinion that discloses its assessment of p. The class wins
at trial when the court preliminarily assesses p as high and loses at trial
when the court preliminarily assesses p as low. Under the weak-form
rule, the court investigates the merits only insofar as they relate to a
specific certification requirement under Rule 23.
Suppose a strong-form rule is in effect. Because the court is
prohibited from inquiring into the merits at certification, P has no
information about the court's views. Because P does not get an advance
peek at the probable outcome, she enjoys no strategic advantage.
Mutuality of estoppel is maintained.
Suppose now that a super-weak rule is in effect. The trial court
certifies a (b)(3) class after assessing p and concluding that the case has
merit. The court issues an opinion explaining its decision and disclosing
the court's estimate of p. If the court concludes that p is high P remains
in the litigation and takes advantage of the anticipated good outcome. If
the court concludes that p is low P opts out and avoids the preclusive
effect of the anticipated bad outcome. 0 9 Because the opt-out decision is
made on the basis of valuable information, P arguably enjoys an unfair
strategic advantage. 1 0
However, the likelihood of prejudice to D from the operation of a
super-weak rule is smaller than first appears. Consider the case where P
opts out of a class when the court finds that p is low. This scenario will
result in harm to D only if the following conditions or events occur. P
must be someone who would not otherwise opt out. The court must
conclude that the case has merit but p is low. The court must also
conclude that the action is otherwise certifiable. The outcome of the
litigation must be unfavorable for P. "' The court's opinion about p must
109. See Stastny v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 n.12 (4th Cir. 1980) (the
specific concern of the Eisen court was "to protect the party opposing the class against a no-risk
specific testing of the merits of the claims by a class representative").
110. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78 (noting that preliminary inquiries would permit the
representative plaintiff to "obtain a determination on the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of
the class without any assurance that a class action may be maintained").
111. If there were no correlation between the results of the preliminary inquiry and the ultimate
judgment or settlement, then the class member would gain no information from the court's precertification investigation.
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be communicated to P who must correctly analyze the opinion, decide to
opt out, and actually exclude herself. P must then participate in a
separate lawsuit against D that results in an outcome more favorable to P
than the outcome would have been if she had not opted out.
Some of these conditions appear plausible. For example, because
only a small percentage of class members opt out of the typical case," 12 it
is likely P would be someone who would not otherwise opt out.
Similarly, it is plausible to assume that the court's preliminary
assessment of p will align with the final outcome. Other conditions are
less plausible. It would be unusual for the trial court to make preliminary
findings that p is low and also certify the class," 3because when p is low,
it will usually be for reasons that also counsel against certification under
Likewise, when p is high, this will
Rule 23's specific requirements.
4
usually support certification.'
It is also doubtful that after opting out, P would be able to
participate in a different lawsuit and obtain an outcome more favorable
than what P would obtain in the first action. Such a lawsuit would
typically be uneconomic unless P joined another class action. But the
smaller class size' 15 and lower probability of success' 16 that would
characterize such alternative litigation would pose an obstacle to any
attorney representing such a class." 7 Moreover, to be successful the

112. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in
Class Action Litigation: Theoreticaland EmpiricalIssues, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
113. Such a finding, however, is not impossible. Imagine, for example, that under the
plaintiffs theory of the case, damages would have to be individually determined for each class
member, whereas under the defendant's theory of the case, no class member would be entitled to
any damages at all. The court might conclude that the defendant has the better argument about the
merits, but might then use this conclusion to support certification because it eliminates the
individual issue of proving damages.
114. For example, in a securities fraud case, it is in the class's interest at trial for the court to
conclude that a fraud-on-the-market presumption is available, since this will potentially eliminate
the otherwise applicable requirements of proving individual reliance, damages, and loss-causation.
But availability of a fraud-on-the-market presumption is also crucial to certification. Conversely, if
a court refuses to recognize a fraud-on-the-market presumption, not only will it be unfavorable to
the class on the merits, it is also likely to reduce the chance the class will be certified.
115. If the alternative class is composed of people who opted out of the first case, the class size
is likely to be significantly reduced.
116. Any attorney contemplating whether to represent the opt-out class would need to consider
carefully the fact that the trial court in the original action has expressed a negative view of the
merits. Even if the second action is filed in a different jurisdiction, the unfavorable judicial opinion
is likely to reduce the settlement value of the new case.
117. The counsel in the first-filed class action would be in an uncomfortable position
representing a class of persons who opted out of the counsel's other case. He cannot be expected to
come forward as champion of the opt-out class.
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second lawsuit must be certified if it is a class action,"' and must
generate a better outcome for P than the first case would have
generated. 1 9Also implausible is the premise that P would grasp the full
implications of the preliminary inquiry and take appropriate action in
response. There is no requirement that the judge issue an opinion
signaling her views of p. If issued, the opinion would not be provided to
P. P would receive instead a notice of certification coupled with
information about how she can opt out. Even if the notice describes the
trial court's preliminary assessment of p,120 it is unlikely to convey the
clear message that P is better off opting out. 12 1 Few Ps would be able to

make an independent evaluation of the pros and cons of opting out and
take appropriate action in response.
Consider now the case where P otherwise would have opted out but
decides not to opt out because the preliminary inquiry discloses the
court's view that p is high. D now faces a class case with another
member. D will suffer prejudice, however, only if a number of
conditions and events occur. First, P must be someone who would
otherwise opt out of the class. Second, the court must make a
preliminary finding that p is high and must also conclude that the action
otherwise satisfies Rules 23(a) and (b). Third, the preliminary
118. The class was certified in the first jurisdiction, but only after the trial court reached an
unfavorable view of the class's chance on the merits. Class counsel in the second case hopes to
persuade the court that the class can be certified-under a preliminary view of the merits more
favorable to the class. But counsel may not succeed at persuading the second tribunal to accept a
view of the merits more favorable to the class. Moreover, because the decision to certify (or not
certify) a class is within the discretion of the trial court, the outcome of a certification dispute can
never be confidently predicted in advance.
119. The probability of a favorable outcome is reduced by the fact that the trial court in the first
action reached an unfavorable view of the class's chances on the merits. Although such a review
would probably not constrain the power of a different trial judge or jury to reach a contrary
conclusion, it nevertheless stands as a warning signal, that an attorney for the class would have to
ignore at her peril.
120. Nothing in Rule 23(c)(2)(B), governing notice in (b)(3) cases, requires that any
information about the court's certification decision be provided to the class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23
(c) (2).
121. None of the parties responsible for notice has an incentive to convey such information.
Once the class has been certified with a preliminary assessment unfavorable to the class on the
merits, the defendant has an interest in keeping as many class members in the forum as possible in
hopes of obtaining a favorable judgment or settlement binding on all who do not opt out. The
plaintiff's attorney also has an interest in discouraging opt-outs. He or she represents the class in the
certified case, and accordingly stands to lose fees if large numbers of class members opt out. As for
the trial judge who oversees the certification notice, there is also little to be gained other than a
headache if large numbers of class members opt out. The case will still remain on the judge's
docket, and opt-outs can cause problems if competing class actions are commenced in other
jurisdictions.
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assessment of p must be communicated to and understood by P and must
result in her deciding not to opt out. Fourth, the ultimate outcome must
favor P. Finally, P must impose greater costs on D by remaining in the
case than she would impose by opting out.
The assumptions of this scenario are in some respects more
plausible than the assumptions of the preceding one. It is likely, for
example, that if the court certifies the case it will also make preliminary
merits findings that p is high. Similarly, if P would otherwise opt out, it
can be inferred that she is interested enough in the case to read the class
action notice and make a reasoned decision about what to do. It is also
plausible to assume that D will be worse off if P stays in the case than if
she opts out. 22 Other assumptions are less plausible, however. Most
importantly, the scenario assumes that P would otherwise opt out. But
class members rarely opt out. 23 Moreover, P might not change her mind
even if she understood the trial court's preliminary inquiry. Some people
opt out because they don't like litigation, don't want to sue D, or just
don't want to be bothered.
Weak-form rules present an intermediate case. Because they
disclose the trial court's preliminary assessment of issues relevant to
certification, they do offer some information that P could use to her
advantage when deciding whether to opt out. The risk of cherry-picking
is therefore higher than in the case of strong-form rules where such
information is prohibited. However, the risk of cherry-picking is
significantly lower than in the case of super-weak rules. Because the
122. This is so because many plaintiffs who would have opted out would probably fail to
pursue their claims in any other forum. The effect is not unambiguous, however. Some plaintiffs
would have participated in litigation against the defendant in an alternative forum if they opted out
of the first case. For alternative litigation to occur, it would be necessary for the opt-out class
member to be represented by counsel. While counsel in the original litigation is unlikely to be
available to represent plaintiffs in such a case, there is a probability that another attorney would
come forward to represent the plaintiff in an alternative forum. In the scenario we are considering,
the judge in the first litigation issues a preliminary assessment of the merits favorable to the class.
Given this premise, it is likely that that the merits are reasonably favorable for the class in
alternative forums as well. With a relatively stronger case, counsel is more likely to come forward
to represent class members who do opt out. As to such plaintiffs, the defendant will be worse off
from the party's decision to remain in the initial litigation only if the added costs of litigation and
expected judgment in the initial litigation with that party remaining in the case exceed the added
costs of litigation and expected judgment that would be incurred in the alternative proceeding if the
party opted out.
123. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 112; Mark W. Friedman, Constrained Individualism
in Group Litigation:Requiring Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out
of a Federal Class Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745, 759 (1990); Stephen E. Morrissey, Note, State
Settlement Class Actions That Release Exclusive Federal Claims: Developing a Framework for
MultyurisdictionalManagement of ShareholderLitigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1809 (1995).
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preliminary inquiry under a weak-form rule relates only to a specific
issue in the case, the trial court's opinion on certification will not
provide an estimate of p. The opinion would require sophisticated
analysis before its impact on p could be understood, a task beyond the
means of most class members. The trial court's preliminary view of the
merits, moreover, is less likely to align with the ultimate outcome than is
its opinion as to p under a super-weak rule. The merits issues addressed
under a weak-form rule will only be a subset of matters relevant to the
ultimate outcome at trial, and often a small subset at that. The results of
the preliminary assessment under a weak-form rule are also less likely to
influence the trial court's subsequent conduct in the case. Because the
issues addressed under a weak-form rule are narrow, they are unlikely to
exercise as much sway on the trial judge's mind; and the presence of
many other issues provides cover for the trial court to change its opinion
without admitting error in the initial decision.
B. Cherry-Dropping:Automatic Benefit
The preceding scenarios assume that P actively decides whether to
opt out or stay in a case. But active decision-making is not necessary for
P to obtain a benefit analogous to one-way intervention. This effect can
be illustrated if we add to the model set forth above the assumption that
P remains entirely passive in the litigation.
Under a strong-form rule, certification has no relationship to the
merits. Accordingly, there should be no correlation between the two.
The certification decision itself therefore confers no systematic
advantage on either party with respect to the preclusive effect of
judgments.
Consider now the situation under a super-weak rule. If the court
concludes on preliminary inquiry that the case is not meritorious, it will
not certify the class and P will automatically avoid the preclusive effect
of the adverse judgment. If the court concludes that the case is
meritorious, it will certify the class and declare p as low or high. If the
probabilities of these events were equal, P would not enjoy any
systematic advantage over D in a certified case. But, the probabilities are
not equal. If the court certifies the case, it is more likely to conclude that
p is high rather than that p is low. Since the class is likely to win at trial
when the court concludes that p is high, P will obtain the advantage of
the favorable outcome by remaining passive. The result is an
approximation of one-way intervention. The cherries of favorable
treatment drop from the tree without having to be picked; the
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certification decision itself does the work. Because this effect does not
depend on opt-out rights, moreover, it could exist for mandatory as well
as opt-out classes.
Again, however, the harm to D under the super-weak rule turns out
to be less serious than first appears. Consider first the situation where the
court certifies the case and the class wins at trial. P obtains the
preclusive effect of a favorable judgment-arguably an unfair result for
D. However, for D to be prejudiced by certification, a number of events
or conditions have to be true. Some of these are plausible. It is
reasonable to assume that P will not opt out and that the court will
conclude thatp is high in a certified case. It is also reasonable to suppose
that the class will win at trial when the court concludes that p is high.
Other events or conditions are less plausible, however. For D to be
prejudiced as a result of the preliminary inquiry, it is usually necessary
that the case would not otherwise be certified. But because strong-form
rules require the court to accept as true the class action allegations in the
complaint, the case will ordinarily be certified in the absence of a
preliminary inquiry. Thus, when p is high, the preliminary inquiry will
usually only confirm a result that the
court would reach in any event.
124
Hence D will usually suffer no harm.
Consider now the case where the trial court denies certification
after a preliminary review of p in a case where P would lose if the case
had proceeded to a judgment as a class action. The effect of the
preliminary inquiry would be to deny D the benefit of a judgment that
binds P to the unfavorable outcome. D appears to be prejudiced.
Some parts of the scenario are plausible. Where the class loses at
trial, it is likely that p is low. Where p is low, the trial court is likely to
find it to be low at the preliminary inquiry. And if the trial court finds p
to be so low that the case lacks merit, the court will refuse to certify the
class. For this scenario to come to pass, however, it will be necessary for
the court to conclude at the preliminary inquiry that the case lacks merit.
Putting aside settlement incentives (for the moment), it would be in
neither party's interest to bring this fact to the court's attention at
certification. P's attorney has two reasons to suppress the information: If
the court knows that the case lacks merit, it is likely to refuse
certification and thus deny P's attorney the class action she seeks. Even
if the court certifies the class, its advance knowledge that the case lacks
124.

See Fisher v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 217 F.R.D. 201, 211 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("Eschewing a

preliminary inquiry into the merits and accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, however,
accords the same benefits to the plaintiff with even less deference to the defendant's position.")
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merit might prejudice its subsequent conduct of the trial, leading to a
greater probability of a bad outcome for P. D does have an incentive to
inform the court that the case lacks merit, eventually. But we are here
assuming that D wants the case to be certified so that it can thereafter
hold class members to an unfavorable judgment. D would delay
informing the court that the case lacks merit until after certification,
since informing the court beforehand merely reduces the probability of a
result (certification) that D desires. Unless the court conducts an
independent investigation, the weakness of the class claims is unlikely to
come to its attention at certification. It is therefore unlikely that
certification will be denied as a result of the preliminary inquiry.
Suppose, however, that the court does become aware that the case
lacks merit. The court might then refuse to certify the class even though
in the absence of a preliminary investigation it would grant certification.
But even here, D would not necessarily suffer material harm from the
loss of a preclusive decree. Preclusion is valuable to D only if P would
participate in other litigation in the event certification is denied. Such
follow-on litigation would face serious obstacles. 125 The preclusive
effect of a decree in a certified class would provide no benefit to D if no
follow-on litigation would be brought.
Weak-form rules are again an intermediate case. The inquiry
authorized in a weak-form rule will, to some extent, align trial outcomes
with the results of the court's preliminary investigation. Thus, unlike the
case with strong-form rules, some cherry-dropping effect is possible. But
the prejudice to D will be less under a weak-form rule than under a
super-weak rule. The reason is that the alignment between trial outcomes
and preliminary investigation is not as strong. As we have seen, under a
weak-form rule the trial court examines only merits issues insofar as
they are convenient or useful to the analysis of specific Rule 23
prerequisites. Even if they stand up through trial, the court's evaluation
of those questions will not necessarily determine outcomes because
other issues not relevant to the merits may swamp them out. The trial
court, moreover, is less likely to adopt a biased view of the case at the
preliminary inquiry under a weak-form rule, and thus should be more

125. Although certification of the first case has been denied and class counsel will be available
to bring the second suit, the first court's opinion finding that the class claims are weak on the merits
would be a significant deterrent. The attorney may also need to consider the possible effects of the
first decision denying class certification. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Prods. Liab.
Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (ordering injunction against state court certification of class
claims where federal court had previously denied certification of identical claims).
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willing than under a super-weak rule to adjust her views as the trial
progresses. Because certification is not as strongly predictive of trial
victory for the class, cherry-dropping is less of a problem for weak-form
rules than it is for super-weak rules.
V.

SETTLEMENT EFFECTS

We now compare Eisen rules with respect to their effects on
settlement. Class certification can convert a small case into one with
potentially devastating consequences,1 26 thus imposing significant
settlement pressures on D. 12 Refusal to certify a class can have equally
devastating consequences for P since it converts viable class litigation
into a negative value individual case. Which rule is most likely to shield
the parties from unfair settlement pressures? Consider the following
extension on the model previously developed. Call P's damages d. P's
expected outcome at trial is p x d. A settlement is fair if it is no more
than twice or less then half p x d and unfair otherwise. All Ps are
identically situated and the requirements for certification are otherwise
satisfied. P sues D and moves to certify a class of 1,000 persons. D is
able to satisfy a judgment up to $75,000,000 without financial distress.
Any judgment over $75,000,000 will cause financial distress. D is averse
to the risk of financial distress and will pay up to ten times the expected
judgment at trial to avoid it. D is risk-neutral about judgments that do
not cause financial distress. If P wins on her individual claims, she gets
$100,000; if she loses, she gets nothing. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, assume that D will offer its full reservation price in
settlement without adjustment for litigation costs and that P will accept
the offer. Both P and D correctly assess p at 1% and d at $100,000 and
the court also correctly assesses p at 1% if a preliminary inquiry is
undertaken.
In such circumstances, if a strong-form rule is in effect, the court
will not conduct a preliminary inquiry into p and will certify the class
because all other prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied. Once the class is
certified, D's maximum exposure is $100,000,000 and its expected
liability at trial is $1,000,000. Because D is averse to the risk of financial
distress posed by the potential exposure to a $ 100,000,000 judgment, D

126. See generally Bone & Evans, supra note 65, at 1251.
127. How overwhelming these pressures are is a matter of current debate. For a view that
debunks this proposition see generally Charles Silver, We're Scared to Death: Class Certification
and Blackrnail,28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357 (2003).
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will pay $10,000,000 or $10,000 per class member to settle the case.
Because this is more than twice p x d, the settlement is unfair. This is the
"blackmail" settlement that proponents of super-weak rules dislike-a
payment far in excess of the actual liability exposure made in a weak
case, only because the defendant fears the low-probability outcome. 128
The super-weak rule addresses this danger. With such a rule in
effect, the court would conduct a preliminary inquiry into p at
certification and refuse to certify the class upon finding that the case
lacks merit. D's maximum exposure on P's individual claim is $100,000.
Because D is risk-neutral as to this outcome, it will pay only its expected
judgment of p x d to settle P's case, or $1,000. Even if all Ps brought
individual lawsuits, D would still be risk-neutral because no one suit
would expose it to a risk of financial distress; thus D would pay at most
a total of $1,000,000 to settle all the cases. So long as no class action is
filed in another jurisdiction after the court denies certification, the superweak rule eliminates the unfair settlement as far as D is concerned.
But while the super-weak rule handles one problem of unfairness, it
does so by creating another. The class claims have some probability of
success, albeit a low one (if the claims were completely frivolous, even a
risk-averse defendant would not pay to settle them because there would
be no reason to fear a bad outcome at trial.) A settlement of P's claim
would be fair if it is at least $500 (half of p x d). But with the superweak rule in effect, P will obtain much less. D would pay an amount
equal to its expected liability to all Ps who bring individual cases in the
event that certification is denied. D expects that few such cases will be
brought, given that each P can expect to recover only $1,000 in an
individual lawsuit. The conditions are present for a settlement class,
which provides only such relief as may be needed to justify a fee for P's
attorney. 129 The result would be a settlement below $500 per P. This is a
blackmail settlement in reverse: Class claims are sold out for pennies on
the dollar. The super-weak rule does not eliminate the unfairness, but
only shifts its incidence.
Other problems become apparent when we allow for party error
about p. It will be rare for P and D to know p with certainty. It will often
be the case, instead, that they are mutually optimistic-P thinks p is
higher than D thinks it is. In fact, given the conditions of the model,
128. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 5, at 375 (stating that a "preliminary assessment of the
merits would preclude certification of the weakest class action claims, where the pressures to settle
are particularly unfair").
129. Providing that the parties can get this settlement past a reviewing court.
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disagreement 30about p would be implied if P moves for class
certification. 1
Suppose D incorrectly believes p is 1% and P correctly believes p is
5%. Under a strong-form rule, the court will certify the class and D will
pay $10,000,000 to settle the class claims. This settlement is fair: Each
class member receives $10,000 which is only twice p x d ($5,000).
The result is different under a super-weak rule. Suppose that after
conducting the preliminary inquiry, the court is equally likely to agree
with D or P. If the court agrees with P, the case will be certified and the
court will issue a ruling accurately assessing p at 5%. After reviewing
the ruling, D would adjust its assessment ofp to 5%. D now estimates its
expected judgment at trial as $5,000 per P, or $5,000,000 overall. Facing
possible financial distress from a class-wide judgment, D will settle for
ten times the expected judgment at trial, or $50,000,000. The settlement
is unfair.
The court might agree with D that p is only 1%. If the court agrees
with D, the case will not be certified and D will pay Ps who sue
individually $1,000 to settle their individual cases. This is a good
outcome for D, although unfair for P. Even so, D's expected settlement
cost under the super-weak rule is more than $25,000,000 (50% x
$50,000,000 + 50% x the expected costs of individual cases that would
be litigated if the case is not certified). D's expected settlement cost of >
$25,000 per class member is unfair because it is more than five times
greater than p x d.
The possibility ofjudicial error in assessing p exacerbates problems
of fairness in settlement under a super-weak rule. Suppose in the
example above that P evaluates p at 5% and D evaluates p at 1%. The
result under a strong-form regime is the same as before: Because the
court takes no account of the merits, the case will be certified and D will
pay $10,000,000 in settlement.
Under a super-weak regime, the outcome depends on the nature of
the error. Suppose that the true value of p is 1%, but the court
erroneously assesses p at 5%. Because the court (erroneously) concludes
that the class claims have merit, it certifies the class. Assume further that
the court is conditioned into an overly favorable view of the class's case
as a result of the mistaken preliminary inquiry, and that in consequence
p becomes 5%. D reviews the decision on class certification, which
130. If both parties know that p is 1% and know that the other party knows this, and they also
know that the court will correctly analyze p in the preliminary inquiry, then P would never bother to
seek certification.
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discloses the court's preliminary assessment of p. D estimates that
because the court is now conditioned into a favorable view of the class's
case, the value of p is 5%. Because D is averse to the risk of the
maximum possible judgment of $100,000,000, D pays ten times the
expected judgment at trial, or $50,000,000 in settlement. The unfairness
of the settlement for D is magnified as a result of the super-weak rule: D
pays each class member fifty times p x d.
Suppose that the true value of p is 5% but the court erroneously
assesses p at 1%. The court will refuse to certify the class. Ps have to sue
individually or recover nothing. Because their individual claims are
small, few of them are likely to sue. Moreover, the likelihood that they
will sue is further reduced by the court's mistake at certification. Since
the court issues an opinion disclosing its (erroneous) estimate of p, an
opinion that will be available to any court adjudicating the individual
suits, Ps will need to adjust downward their estimates of p. Instead of
receiving $50,000,000, the amount D would pay to settle the class case if
the court correctly estimated p, or even $10,000,000, the fair settlement
if the court correctly estimated p, Ps receive only a few thousand dollars
in the aggregate, an outcome even more unfair than the situation where
the court correctly estimates p at 1%.
Judicial error under a super-weak rule can thus result in settlements
that are unfair to either P or D. As between them, however, P is more
likely to suffer harm. The reason is that because the preliminary inquiry
into p occurs early in the litigation, D will be able control the
information available to the court. D's advantage would be even greater
if the court adopted the recommendation of some commentators that p
should be determined through test-case litigation.'13 In such litigation,
the stakes for D would be far greater than the stakes for any P. For this
reason, D will tend to expend greater resources than Ps and will have an
incentive to offer generous settlements to make test cases "go away" if

131. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class CertificationBased on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN.
L. REv. 1, 4-6 (2001) (proposing that a sample of "typical" claims be tried prior to final certification
in order to provide information about the value of the class claims). The Seventh Circuit, in RhonePoulenc, did something like this when it examined the results of individual cases already completed
in order to assess the value ofp. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.
1995) (concluding that, based on the fact that defendants had won 12 of 13 individual cases, there
was a "great likelihood" that the class claims "lack[ed] legal merit"). Judge Parker of the Eastern
District of Texas proposed a similar procedure for assessing the value of asbestos cases, although
for purposes of deciding the case on the merits rather than class certification. See Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653-54 (E.D. Tex. 1990). However, the idea was rejected
by the Fifth Circuit. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1990).
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they have bad facts. The predictable result is that test-case litigation will
generate estimates ofp that are below the true value of that parameter.
Weak-form rules appear to offer a better mix of settlement effects
than either of the alternatives. Unlike strong-form rules, they do not
require the trial court to accept the plaintiffs allegations as true. In
consequence, they will sometimes work to prevent certification of cases
when the defendant's aversion to the risk of a ruinous judgment forces
an unfair settlement. On the other hand, weak-form rules are less likely
than super-weak rules to have other adverse settlement effects. They do
not preclude certification of low-probability, non-frivolous cases. Thus,
they are less likely to force class counsel to settle out claims for much
less than their expected value at trial in order to avoid the lack of any
recovery at all that would follow from denial of certification. Moreover,
weak-form rules, unlike super-weak
rules, do not interact pathologically
132
with party or judicial error.
VI.

JUDICIAL ECONOMY

A final consideration in the design of an Eisen rule is its effect on
judicial economy.' 33 A strong-form rule conserves judicial and party
resources because it obviates any need for the court to inquire into the
merits at certification. The fact that a strong-form rule achieves this kind
of economy is hardly an argument in its favor, however. The same sort
of economy could be achieved any time issues are excluded from a case.
If a court in an antitrust case simply declared, without evidence, that the
defendant possessed power in the relevant market, this would certainly
simplify the trial of the case, but it would do so at a high and
inappropriate cost since the existence of market power is one of the
principal matters at issue in the litigation. When an inquiry into the
merits is necessary or appropriate to resolve an important issue for
certification, the summary adjudication made possible by a strong-form

132. If, for example, D erroneously estimates p as low, the results of the preliminary inquiry
under a weak-form rule will not necessarily cause D to revise its estimate of p upward by a
significant amount because the court's opinion will not reveal much information about p. The
problem of unfair settlements will not be magnified as under a super-weak regime. Similarly,
judicial error will be less of a problem under a weak-form rule. Courts will be less prone to make
errors about the specific issues relevant to certification. And if error occurs, it will be less likely to
cause error at trial and thus will have a smaller effect on D's estimate ofp.
133. See Bone & Evans, supra note 65, at 1317-19 (analyzing "process costs" of rules on
certification and the substantive merits).
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than the fact that it will save resources
rule requires greater justification
13 4
for the court and the parties.
The efficiency effects of super-weak rules are ambiguous. Because
p is the ultimate issue in the litigation, the preliminary inquiry must be
extensive enough to yield an informed decision. If the result of that
inquiry is an accurate conclusion that the case lacks merit, the court will
refuse to certify the class. The denial of certification conserves judicial
resources in the class case since the expected outcome is that the class
would lose at any event at trial. But the denial of certification also
permits Ps to sue individually. If, as often will be the case, such suits are
not pursued, the super-weak rule will conserve resources. But if Ps sue
individually, notwithstanding the court's preliminary assessment that the
case lacks merit, the burden on the court could increase because issues
that could be handled on a common basis in class litigation must now be
litigated separately in each individual case.
If after initial inquiry the court concludes that the case has merit,
the super-weak rule could increase the burden on the court and the
parties to the extent that overlapping issues will have to be retried at the
merits phase. Intelligent litigation management can reduce the
overlap.' 35 But inevitably, some inefficiency will result: There will be
duplication in discovery, multiple depositions, and extra judicial
hearings. On the other hand, the preliminary inquiry may conserve on
resources to the extent that it results in more informed judicial decisions
during the trial phase. Even more important, the court's preliminary
assessment of p may induce the parties to adopt more realistic
bargaining positions and thus facilitate earlier settlements.
The efficiency implications of the weak-form rule are also
ambiguous. Because they authorize preliminary inquiries into the merits,
weak-form rules are more burdensome at the front end than strong-form
rules. But because the inquiry is focused on merits issues that
134. In other cases, moreover, a strong-form rule can foster diseconomy rather than economies
of litigation. Consider a case where the judge, from prior experience with the subject matter of a
case, knows that she is likely to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The arguments
that would be fatal to the claim on the motion to dismiss are also brought forward by the defendant
as objections to certifying the class. It would make little sense, in this scenario, for the court to
apply a strong-form rule to avoid reaching the merits, certify the class, and only then reach the
merits and either dismiss the case or decertify the class. Cf Stastny v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628
F.2d 267, 275 n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1980) (observing the potential waste of judicial resources inherent in
deferred denial of class certification based on adverse merits determinations, but viewing such a
waste as real only if the court could have decided the merits earlier).
135. See McGuire, supra note 5, at 401 (arguing that much of the work of the preliminary
investigation into the substantive merits could be reused at trial).
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specifically relate to the certification requirements of Rule 23, weakform rules entail a less onerous inquiry than super-weak rules. As in the
case of super-weak rules, moreover, preliminary inquiries under a weakform rule might have efficiency-enhancing effects to the extent that they
focus the trial court's attention on the case at an early point in the
litigation and induce better trial and pretrial management. Preliminary
merits rulings under weak-form rules may also facilitate earlier
settlements, although the settlement effect for weak-form rules is likely
to be less pronounced than for super-weak rules where the court's
preliminary assessment of p addresses the ultimate question in the
lawsuit. Similarly, the potential inefficiencies of the preliminary inquiry
under a weak-form rule can be mitigated if the parties and the trial court
organize the inquiry in such a way that the efforts of the court and the
parties are not duplicated at trial.
VII. WHY A WEAK-FORM RULE IS BEST

We can now draw the strands of normative analysis together in
order to develop an overall assessment of which rule offers the best
combination of social policy benefits.
Strong-form rules have little to recommend them and should be
abandoned. 36 They cannot be justified as plausible interpretations of
Rule 23 and are in fact inconsistent with Rule 23 insofar as they bar
courts from inquiring into relevant matters.
Strong-form rules impair the accuracy of certification decisions by
excluding relevant information. They may increase the accuracy of trial
outcomes by preventing the court from making mistakes at certification
that "color" subsequent proceedings, but this effect is ambiguous
because early exposure to merits issues may improve rather than impair
trial outcomes. Even if trial outcomes are improved, on balance, the
increase in accuracy at trial provided by a strong-form rule would have
to be weighed against the loss of accuracy at certification. Given the
widely-recognized importance of certification for the success or failure
of class litigation, it is unlikely that the increase in trial accuracy which a
strong-form rule might accomplish could justify the significant decrease
in accuracy at certification.
Strong-form rules find limited support in the concern for fairness to
defendants, since if rigorously applied they prevent class members from
136. This view is shared by other recent commentators. See generally Bone & Evans, supra
note 65, at 1251; McGuire, supra note 5 (advocating jettisoning strong-form rule in its entirety).
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taking advantage of favorable outcomes while avoiding the binding
effects of unfavorable ones. But a number of events or conditions have
to coincide before cherry-picking or cherry-dropping will result in harm
to defendants. Moreover, while defendants benefit from the leveling of
the playing field with respect to the preclusive effect of judgments, they
suffer collateral harm from the increased settlement pressure that follows
when the court accepts as true the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint. Nor can strong-form rules be justified as means for
conserving litigation resources. To the extent they reduce the burden on
the parties and the courts, they do so only by removing relevant
considerations from the court's analysis. This is not a good justification
for judicial economy.
Super-weak rules are equally undesirable and should not be
adopted. They have no basis in the text or history of Rule 23. Because
they permit or require trial courts to inquire into an issue that is not an
explicit certification factor under Rule 23, they may introduce a
confounding issue that results in erroneous certification decisions. They
present a risk of "coloring" the trial with potentially erroneous findings.
Fairness to the defendant with respect to the preclusive effect of
judgments is also a concern under super-weak rules. These rules provide
significant information that may give plaintiffs an unfair advantage in
making opt-out decisions. They also align the certification decision with
the ultimate result at trial, resulting in an automatic "cherry-dropping"
benefit to class members. Although defendants will only occasionally
experience significant harm from these scenarios, the risk of unfairness
to defendants that troubled the Court in Eisen is not insubstantial.
Super-weak rules address the problem of unfair settlements of weak
cases. But they do so only by introducing other problems. Denial of
certification of non-frivolous but weak cases-has devastating settlement
consequences for class members. Moreover, problems of unfair
settlements are exacerbated under a super-weak regime when party or
judicial error is introduced. Super-weak rules likewise appear less
attractive from the standpoint of judicial efficiency. Because they require
the court to conduct an inquiry into the ultimate issue at trial, the
certification stage can be anticipated to be costly for the parties and
time-consuming for the court. This fact in itself would not be troubling if
the results of the preliminary inquiry could be utilized at later stages of
the case or in individual litigation of cases after certification is denied.
But often the efforts will be wasted.
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Weak-form rules are superior along most of the relevant policy
dimensions. Such rules are easy to justify in the language of Rule 23 and
find increasing support in the lower federal courts and the views of
commentators.1 37 Weak-form rules provide greater accuracy in the
certification decision than either a strong-form rule or a super-weak rule.
As to accuracy at trial, weak-form rules are likely to be superior to
super-weak rules (because of the risk that error in assessing p will color
subsequent proceedings and result in erroneous outcomes). Weak-form
rules have strengths and weaknesses, with respect to error at trial, as
compared with strong-form rules.
Weak-form rules are subject, to some extent, to the problems of
cherry-picking and cherry-dropping discussed earlier in this Article. But
because the preliminary inquiry is restricted to narrow issues, these
problems are less severe for weak-form rules than for super-weak rules.
As applied to weak-form rules, at least, the poltergeist of one-way
intervention conjured in Eisen has few material manifestations.
Weak-form rules provide some protections to defendants against
the risk of unfair settlements. Because there is a strong expected
alignment between the preliminary findings on the merits and a court's
propensity to certify the class, negative findings on merits issues will
often prevent certification. Thus, if the class cases are extremely weak,
the result even under a weak-form rule may be denial of certification. In
this respect, weak-form rules are arguably superior to strong-form rules
that offer no protection against certification of doubtful cases. Superweak rules appear to offer still greater protections in this regard, but they
do so at unacceptable costs in other respects. Weak-form rules are more
demanding of judicial and party resources than strong-form rules that
preclude all preliminary inquiry into the merits. But as noted above,
some of the work at the initial inquiry stage could be recycled. Weakform rules appear to achieve greater litigation efficiency than superweak rules, which require the trial court to investigate the ultimate issue
of the plaintiff's probability of success.

137. Bone and Evans endorse a weak-form rule as one possible approach, although for
different reasons than those set forth in this Article. Bone & Evans, supra note 65, at 1278 (offering
the principle that the "trial judge [should] review the evidence and determine whether the legal and
factual issues on which the parties rely to support (or oppose) commonality, typicality,
predominance, and other Rule 23 certification requirements are in fact viable").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss1/2

36

Miller: Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification
2004]

CLASS ACTION CERTIFICA TION

87

CONCLUSION

The strong-form interpretation of Eisen, under which a trial court
may not conduct a reasoned inquiry into merits issues as they relate to
class certification, cannot be justified under any plausible analysis of
public policy. It should be abandoned, and soon. But super-weak rules,
which permit or even require the court to inquire into the plaintiffs
ultimate probability of success at trial, are also ill-advised. They are not
defensible as interpretations of Rule 23 and are objectionable from the
standpoint of the relevant social policies. The weak-form interpretation,
which permits the trial court to investigate the merits provided that doing
so is convenient and useful to analyzing the certification requirements of
Rule 23, provides the best mix of social policy benefits and is most
consistent with the language and spirit of Rule 23.
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